31 goals this season compared to 12 in the first eleven appearances of last season . 41 goals overall between the league and the Champions League, with 14 players from the squad involved . These statistics alone would be enough to demonstrate Roma's significant improvement in terms of playing style.
It's clear—as the coach recently emphasized—that the Giallorossi team today expresses itself in the image and likeness of its coach. For years, however, Gasperini's style has often been reduced to the concept of man-to-man pressure across the entire pitch . This detail, while not in possession, has certainly defined the tactical identity of his teams, but it's only a prerequisite for the enormous work undertaken by the Grugliasco-born coach.
A principle built through intense training and the mental habit of attacking forward, which facilitates his teams' recovery of the ball and then unleashes deadly vertical transitions. From this perspective, Atalanta has been the epitome of this concept, so much so that the Goddess managed to score between 90 and 110 goals per season each year. But, setting aside set-piece goals, another important factor in the offensive scoring, Roma today demonstrates further evolution of Gasperini's style of football when in possession.
Rotations and changes of position: it's total football
Observing the Giallorossi's matches and the development of their play, Roma today displays a first-rate tactical maturity that puts them on par with Europe's top teams. The first phase involves rotations applied to the basic 3-4-2-1 formation. Cristante and Konè, or at least the two midfielders, often tend to drop to the flanks of Ndicka (the sweeper) when in possession, with the two wing-backs taking a very wide position on the midfield flank.
In turn, the two wingers take up positions almost like wingers, following Malen's lead. The Dutchman occupies the center-forward position but often moves toward or slides laterally, rotating his position with Mora or Soulé/Dybala, creating additional spaces to attack.
In this way, Roma almost seems to empty the central area of the midfield, positioning themselves in a perimeter shape.
This is the starting philosophical principle: everyone is in motion, everyone must play multiple roles during the game.
The search has a specific direction: never give the opponent reference points, arrange yourself on different lines that also allow for a quick recovery of the ball when not in possession.
On this constant rotation, Gasperini then builds his strategies based on the characteristics or tactical disposition of his opponent.
Zone or high pressure: here's how Roma deciphers the opponent and sinks
Against teams that defend in a zone with a three-quarter defense, Roma often adopt a strategy that is very visible from above: they start with a horizontal or diagonal ball circulation, which leads to overloading one side , to then expose the opposite one.
From there the 'signaler' is usually Mario Hermoso , who, having received the ball, plays with openings of 40-50 metres to the opposite side where perhaps Molina receives the ball, Soulè is in the central half-space and Mancini or Balerdi overlap.
This triangulation of movements creates doubt in the opponent who doesn't know whether to come out to the man or follow the insertion of the arm who, as often happens, arrives at the cross (Ghilardi for Mora against Cagliari).
There, the choice of who initially receives the ball from Hermoso's throw and the technical cleanliness in the search for the one-two or in the exchanges, defines the final quality of the finishing and therefore generates the goal opportunity.
How many Giallorossi moves arise from triangulation on the flanks? And how many goals come from these movements? Opponents know it all, but struggle to create countermeasures that prevent Roma from finding the right opening to break through the wall erected by the defensive castellation in or near the penalty area.
This season, the quality of the finishing from the midfielders has also improved, with Wesley, Molina and Lulli having already combined to provide 8 assists.
These movements on the right or left side are now made mechanically by Roma, but they don't stop there.
Against a slightly lower block or one that always deploys in a zonal fashion, with an occupation of spaces that generates great density in the middle of the pitch, Cristante often seeks the option of a first-time pass into the half-spaces.
The example is the two long balls he made for Soulè against Udinese (a chance that hit the post) and against Sassuolo when the Argentine found himself one-on-one with Muric and then decided not to shoot on goal but to provide the assist for Malen who then went to waste.
A constant focus on verticality sometimes leads Gasperini to go into a frenzy when his players decide to play the ball back towards the defenders.
Where Roma face teams that press high up the pitch , Gasperini's men adopt another double mechanism to overcome the obstacle of the initial press without losing quality in ground play.
The rapid passing of the ball between the defenders or with the midfielders creates the need to find an outlet along the midfield line, always vertically, with Dybala, above all, capable of clearing the ball and then playing it quickly to another attacking midfielder.
Soulè has also improved a lot in receiving the ball with his back to the opponent, dribbling and passing it to a teammate who then sets off several men to attack the opponent's area.
Wesley 's best qualities come into play in this dynamic: as an attacker, he can unleash his strength and speed in depth.
The alternative is to let the ball cross the midfield. Against Fiorentina, Hermoso runs straight into space for Dybala, who plays it down and then passes it to Malen for the 2-0 goal.
The deep ball from the arm to the winger (Wesley) or to the attacker is another characteristic of the evolution of Gasperini's football, which generates advantages because by attacking high up the pitch, on second balls, Roma, working synchronously on preventative play, are then able to recover the ball high up the pitch and suffocate the opponent for several consecutive minutes.
Mancini, Balerdi, and Ghilardi himself sometimes look for deep space, only to be attacked by a full-back, a wide attacker, or Malen himself. If played with the right timing and avoiding the opponent's offside trap, Roma are good at closing the pitch forward while maintaining the right distance.
This happened, for example, with Molina against Sassuolo, who was passed into space by Ndicka on a first-time pass following a teammate's backward pass. The Argentine found himself in the penalty area within two seconds, then mistimed the shot, sending it wide.
A multifaceted Roma, then, with countless strategies refined for each match, tailored to the different characteristics of their opponents . And so the question arises: what would the Giallorossi team become, in terms of identity, play, and therefore results, if they were to add even more quality in certain positions? The first useful answer must come from the club in January.
